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In an influential article in 2001, Professor Stephen
Gardbaum drew attention to a family resemblance between
Commonwealth legal systems which offered some form of
constitutional rights review, but within a framework that
permitted the supremacy of the legislature. For example, Section
33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms permits
legislative override of the Charter by the federal or any provincial
parliament, and the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998
empowers judges to declare acts of the UK Parliament
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights,
which leaves the impugned law on the books (sometimes for
years). This combination of judicial review with continuing
legislative supremacy, along with parliamentary and executive
consideration of rights-compliance before legislation is enacted,
has been noticed by others as well. Mark Tushnet classified such

1. MacArthur Foundation Professor of International Justice and Human Rights,
UCLA School of Law.
2. Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Laws, University College London. The author thanks
Nick Barber, Grégoire Webber, Tom Hickman and Stefan Theil for helpful feedback. The
author commented on Stephen Gardbaum’s book at a seminar at the Faculty of Laws,
University College London in June 2013, and benefitted greatly from Gardbaum’s helpful
clarifications, as well as his exceptional collegiality in stimulating critical discussion of the
book’s themes.
3. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001).
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systems as having “weak form review,” 4 and Janet Hiebert has
5
dubbed them the “parliamentary model.”
In this book, Gardbaum deepens his analysis of these
systems by identifying what he regards as the main characteristics
of this model, and presenting an elaborate normative defense of
them. He argues that the “New Commonwealth Model” found in
Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and Australia represents a
normatively compelling “third way” between the strong form, or
“court-centric” form of constitutional rights review familiar in the
United States and Germany, and the model of parliamentary
sovereignty, which, in its classical British form, forbids judges to
question the validity of any act of Parliament. Gardbaum’s book
should be of interest to American constitutional lawyers, not only
because the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” is a perennial
concern, and Gardbaum engages to some extent with Bickel, Ely,
Tushnet,
Ackerman
and
other
leading
American
constitutionalists. It is also because he defends a model of judicial
review that is a radical departure from the American brand.
In this review essay, I illustrate how Gardbaum has
illuminated an important phenomenon in comparative
constitutional law. He has shown with unparalleled rigour and
insight how the various interlocking features of the
Commonwealth model of constitutional rights protection work,
and has put forth a novel argument about how they ought to work.
However, I will also argue that his exercise in theory building is
problematic from methodological and substantive standpoints. In
his quest to build an “internal theory of the New Model,”
Gardbaum’s approach equivocates between describing the
jurisdictions and prescribing how they should operate. His
methodology of finding a third way between two schools of
thought in British constitutional theory is marred by the failure of
the distinction to be stable and convincing, and by the doomed
attempt to blend irreconcilable positions about the value of
judicial review in a rights-based democracy.
As to substance, my key gripe is with the crucial proposal that
legislatures should consider, but ultimately disregard, judicial
declarations that statutes violate rights if the legislature
reasonably disagrees with the judgment. This idea, I argue, is
4. MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009); see also
Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781 (2003).
5. Janet L. Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models
Resist Judicial Dominance When Interpreting Rights? 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1963 (2004).
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incompatible with Gardbaum’s own position about legislative
failures to protect rights, it holds out a Panglossian hope for
legislative cooperation, and it fails to acknowledge the very
substantial rule of law problems we would have in a society where
judicial decisions were treated like legal advice.
I. AN OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
A. THE THEORY OF THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL
Part I sets out the “theory” of the New Commonwealth
Model, whereas Part II sets out the “practice,” namely, the way
the model operates in some key jurisdictions that recently
adopted bills of rights, including Canada (1982), New Zealand
(1990), the United Kingdom (1998) and some Australian states
(2004, 2006). Part I is an outline of the essential features of the
model as Gardbaum defines it, a normative argument in defense
of these features, and an exploration of how an ideal model ought
to work.
So what are these features? The model essentially has four of
them (pp. 25ff, see also 37–46, 77–94). The first characteristic is a
codified bill of constitutional rights. This bill can be in a written
constitution or in statutory form provided they have “some form
of higher law status” (pp. 35–36). For example, while the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a part of the
entrenched Canadian constitution, the UK Human Rights Act
1998 (HRA), New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA),
and the Victorian Charter are all legislation passed through
ordinary channels and (unlike the entrenched Canadian Charter)
repealable under the ordinary legislative process. Even so, the
perception in the UK is that the HRA is a “constitutional
6
statute,” and one can suppose the same for the NZBORA. This
means that these statutes have a more hallowed status than
ordinary law, making them politically harder to amend or repeal,
and possibly giving them special legal status that would allow
them to prevail over conflicting statutes under certain
circumstances.
The second feature is that there is pre-enactment political
rights review. The HRA imposes a duty on the UK Minister
introducing a bill in Parliament to issue a formal “statement” to

6. On the judicial recognition of this status, see R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd.) v
Sec’y of State for Transport [2014] U.K.S.C. 3, esp. [207]–[209].
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Parliament that a bill complies or does not comply with the
European Convention on Human Rights. The Joint Committee
on Human Rights (a select committee of both Houses of
Parliament—(JCHR)), furthermore, must report to Parliament
on the human rights implications of any bill. Gardbaum regards
the JCHR as truly exemplary of pre-enactment political rights
review, and this reviewer wholeheartedly agrees. The Victorian
Charter, and NZBORA, provide similar mechanisms. The
Canadian Charter is not accompanied by any legislatively
formalized mechanism as such, but the administrative practice is
to inquire thoroughly into the Charter compatibility of proposed
7
legislation, sometimes with a view to “charter proofing,” at
others with a good faith intention of compliance. These are all
examples of pre-enactment political rights review, though they
vary in quality. Gardbaum considers the Canadian approach to be
weakest because the pre-enactment review is by the executive
8
rather than the legislature (pp. 122–23). For this type of preenactment political review to operate properly, he argues, it
should be neither exclusively an executive nor legislative process,
but rather both. And it should not be about averting legal risk, but
rather be proactive and normatively wide-ranging, and thus free
from the fetters that bind (or at least preoccupy) judges.
The third essential feature is judicial rights review. Gardbaum
here envisages “constitutional review” (p. 83), and beyond the
obvious features one would expect, his theory embodies a curious
departure from standard models. While on the one hand, he is
opposed to interpretive judicial supremacy, on the other, he
argues that judges should not defer to legislatures on account of
their democratic legitimacy. “Judicial rights review should be
respectful but unapologetic. . . . [The passive virtues] would be
structurally misplaced and counterproductive in a system of
penultimate judicial review” (p. 85). So judges should give their
judgments on the merits and not drift towards “reasonableness
review” or any other representation-reinforcing standard. Why
would they, if the legislature can have the final word? Gardbaum
maintains that the court’s role is nonetheless to
inform the legislature and alert the citizenry of their rights
concerns from a legal perspective posed by a piece of
legislation. Here the virtues of skilled professionalism and
judicial independence from electoral accountability within a
7.
8.

Michael Plaxton, Charter Proofing in Canada, 8 Y.B. N.Z. JURIS. 217 (2005).
He contrasts this with the UK’s executive and legislative model (pp. 193–94).
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majoritarian political system, especially a parliamentary one,
play their role – not by conclusively or automatically rendering
the ultimate decision, but by bringing a perspective to bear on
it that may otherwise not be brought (p. 84).

This position of recommending a combination of
“unapologetic” judicial review on the understanding that the
legislature can merely disregard the declaration has also been
advanced by Francesca Klug and Danny Nicol in the United
9
Kingdom, the latter being more skeptical of courts than Klug or
Gardbaum. Here the skeptical reader will raise an eyebrow. If the
courts are unapologetic but the legislature compliant, the
recommendation might make things worse. And further, there is
no discussion of epistemic grounds for judicial restraint, despite
this being well tilled soil in the literature on the subject in both the
U.S. and the Commonwealth.
The fourth, “critical, and distinctive, hybrid feature of the
new model” is the formal legal power of legislative reconsideration
(pp. 45, 87–94). The four legal systems he discusses all have formal
ongoing legislative supremacy over (most) rights questions. Yet
he argues further however that this formal power must be
exercised from time to time if the normative arguments
supporting the New Commonwealth Model are accepted. In his
model, in other words, legislatures would have the last word, as a
matter of both law and practice. None of the four systems actually
respect the criteria/practice of legislative reconsideration as he
sets it out. In brief, the UK and Canadian parliaments tend to
accept or “comply” with court judgments, and the New Zealand
and Australian ones have a paucity of caselaw and disinterested
legislatures.
Although Gardbaum argues in favor of legislative
reconsideration, he regards the development of “norms of
legitimate use” to be an urgent task, and this is an especially
helpful part of the book. The first is procedural: “the legislature
must engage in serious and principled reconsideration of the
10
judicial decision on the rights issue” (p. 89). The second is
substantive: if after careful engagement, the legislature decides it
reasonably disagrees with the judgment, it should substitute its
own judgment and thus affirmatively nullify or disregard the

9. Francesca Klug, Judicial deference under the Human Rights Act 1998, 2 EUR.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 125, 131 (2003); Danny Nicol, Law and Politics after the Human Rights
Act, 4 PUB. L. 722, 744 (2006).
10. He adds “respectful” as well (p. 89).
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judgment. As he says in the discussion of Canada, “[t]he new
model does not depend on courts exercising their power of the
final word to defer to reasonable legislative disagreements, but on
legislatures exercising theirs” (p. 123).
Part I of the book situates this model within some of the
comparative constitutional law and constitutional theory
literature, and presents an affirmative argument in favor of it.
Gardbaum argues that it represents a “hybrid model” between
legislative and judicial supremacy. In a succinct passage
encapsulating the core idea of the system, he argues that
[t]he new model creates an institutional alternative to the
traditional form of political constitutionalism and
parliamentary sovereignty because it creates a different
division between legislative and judicial power—granting
greater power and responsibility to the courts for the
protection of rights and a greater role for legal argument as a
practical constraint on political decision-making (p. 44).

Whatever critical commentary that follows below, I think this
basic insight is correct and highly valuable, and it does apply to
various degrees in the four jurisdictions he discusses, whether or
not they respect the normative prescriptions he elaborates in Part
I of the book.
B. THE PRACTICE OF THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL
Part II of the book is a valuable one hundred and twentypage exploration of many of the features of the four interrelated
legal systems and how constitutional review fits within them. In
each chapter, the basic features of the jurisdiction are outlined; it
is explained how it operates in practice; and the jurisdiction’s law
and practice is assessed for its fit with the New Commonwealth
Model outlined in the first part of the book.
The discussion of Canada is quite interesting, and Gardbaum
is notably critical of the concept of “dialogue” between courts and
legislatures, as well as of the arguments of Hogg, Thornton,
Roach and others, who argue that the existence of a general
limitations provision in Section 1 of the Charter or the remedy of
suspending the effect of a declaration of invalidity do much work
in curtailing judicial supremacy (pp. 118–20). I tend to agree with
his arguments on this point. Instead, Gardbaum finds the power
of legislative override in Section 33 to be the truly distinctive “new
model feature” (p. 115, see generally pp. 114–21), though he also
finds it in the Minister of Justice’s duty to report to the Canadian
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parliament on the compliance of bills with the Charter of Rights.
He criticizes both features for being ineffective, however: the
reporting duty is legalistic and to date has never reported a bill as
non-compliant, and the Section 33 override power has
11
unfortunately “largely fallen into non-use” (p. 110). The New
Commonwealth Model would strongly urge that it be used more
often.
New Zealand is the jurisdiction which comes closest to
Gardbaum’s ideal theory, so it can be explored in a bit more
depth. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) is a
statutory bill of rights, as are the counter-parts in the UK and
Australia. The NZBORA allows courts to quash executive action
that violates any of the protected rights, but expressly states that
courts have no power to disapply legislation and, uniquely in this
family, provides for no expressly stated judicial power to declare
statutes to be inconsistent with the bill of rights. The method of
interpretation in NZBORA cases involving legislative
infringements of rights is to (1) find the right to have been limited
unreasonably under section 5; (2) seek to render a rightsconsistent statutory interpretation (similar to an “as applied”
12
challenge in U.S. constitutional law) under Section 6; and, failing
success here, (3) declare under Section 4 that the court is obliged
to apply the statute and dismiss the claim. The effect of this
process is that judges in effect find that statutes violate the
NZBORA but not by way of official declaration. The result is that
the claimant still loses the case, and Section 4 cases have less
political salience.
Gardbaum assesses the impact of the NZBORA on the
legislative process along two lines. The first is pre-enactment
legislative rights review. In sharp contrast with Canada, the
Attorney General in New Zealand has specified 59 reports of
inconsistency since 1990, 28 on government bills and 31 on nongovernment bills (a crucial distinction in the Westminster system
– the latter not normally expected to pass, and the Attorney
General is a Minister who sits in the Cabinet). Of the first 22
government bills with such reports, 19 became law without
relevant amendments, and the non-government bills “have not
11. The best study I have seen on the use and origins of Section 33 is David Johansen
and Philip Rosen, The Notwithstanding Clause of the Canadian Charter,
PARLIAMENTARY BACKGROUND PAPER (Law and Government Division,
Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Pub. No. BP-194-E, 2008; rev. 2012).
12. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) for a recent
judicial discussion.
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fared so well” as the government bills 13 (pp. 134–35). The second
line of assessment is the impact of judicial findings (not
declarations) of inconsistency on legislative behavior. Gardbaum
could find four examples of where the courts had made findings
that were subsequently considered by Parliament. In one case
(same sex marriage), it is unclear whether the judgment was the
prime mover; in another (compensation rights for prisoners), the
legislative response was part nullification; and in a further
(availability of a public law damages for executive breaches of the
NZBORA), the legislature let the case stand rather than affirm or
nullify it. On my reading, it was only one of the four cases – where
14
the Court of Appeal in R v Poumako “invited Parliament to
reconsider” its application of retrospective penalty provisions –
that there was any robust legislative response that would not
otherwise have arose. Gardbaum’s defense of the record of
impact on the legislative process is that it is “sufficiently mixed to
belie the claim of irrelevance” (p. 149), though he also accepts it
is “fairly minimal.” In an apparent act of alchemy, he even
interprets the Hansen episode (pp. 142–143), where Parliament
not only disregarded a judicial finding of inconsistency but
extended the reach of the impugned reverse-onus measure, as an
example that illustrates what his model commends (p. 150).
The discussion of the United Kingdom focuses on debates in
the UK about whether the Human Rights Act 1998 has made any
difference (i.e., whether it was “futile”), and about the potent
form of rights-consistent statutory interpretation under Section 3,
as well as the impact of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on
the legislative process. He is keen to establish that the UK system
is “distinctive” from strong forms of judicial review, responding
to local commentators who he regards as arguing that it is not
strongly dissimilar. There are some methodological problems in
this chapter concerning the collection of empirical data. On the
number of section 3 findings that are tantamount to disapplying
statutes, Gardbaum derives the figure of “roughly twenty uses”
from a speculative claim by a judge that it had not been used in
more than a dozen cases in its first five years, and by a
constitutional law and theory scholar, Aileen Kavanagh, that it
had been used rarely (p. 171). This is at odds with the general rigor
elsewhere in the book, but nevertheless symptomatic of a
weakness regarding the treatment of empirical evidence (p. 171 n.
13. See also Andrew Geddis, The Comparative Irrelevance of the NZBORA to
Legislative Practice, 23 N.Z. L. REV. 465 (2009).
14. R v Poumako, [2000] 2 NZLR 695 (CA).
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63). 15 What is more engaging in Gardbaum’s discussion is his clear
desire to see Parliament consider and disregard more judicial
declarations of incompatibility. He argues that if Parliament
continues to be “overly reluctant” to disagree with declarations of
incompatibility, the wording of the Human Rights Act should be
amended to clarify that Parliament is the supreme interpreter, for
example by adopting the wording used in the Victorian Charter
(pp. 201–02).
The experience in Australia is recent, and subject to a short
but enlightening chapter. While the federal government in
Australia rejected a national human rights act in 2010, the
Australian Capital Territory adopted one in 2004 and the State of
Victoria another in 2006. The ACT Charter allows courts to issue
declarations of incompatibility, while the Victorian Charter opts
for the language of “declarations of inconsistency.” Both are
functionally analogous to the UK remedy discussed above,
though Gardbaum appears to think the text makes a principled
difference. Whatever the principles, the practical difference is that
courts have taken a timid approach – only one declaration has
been issued between both jurisdictions since the adoption of the
Charters, and it was overturned on appeal to the High Court of
Australia. (p. 215) As Gardbaum readily acknowledges, the
difficult issue for his theory is whether these charters, “as with
New Zealand,” operate sufficiently distinctly from a system of
pure legislative supremacy to fit with his model (pp. 220–21).
C. THE BOOK’S MANY MERITS
Gardbaum writes with admirable economy and clarity, and
the book has a number of other outstanding merits. The first is the
author’s exceptional sensitivity to developments and literature in
each jurisdiction he discusses. Gardbaum’s understanding of the
institutional characteristics of each key system, of the output of
their courts and political actors, of the wealth of secondary
literature, and of the interrelations between them, is unsurpassed.
It is the culmination of over a decade of careful research into the

15. The problem is compounded later in the chapter when he compares the figures
for all declarations of incompatibility in the UK with declarations of unconstitutionality
issued by the Canadian Supreme Court alone. My own calculations, found in Jeff King,
Parliament's Role Following Declarations of Incompatibility under the Human Rights Act,
in PARLIAMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ADDRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
(Hayley Hooper et al. eds., forthcoming from Hart Publishing), found the Canadian courts
to issue at least three times the number, though there are further complicating factors such
as the number of provincial legislatures in Canada.

KING GARDBAUM REVIEW_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

110

12/29/2014 3:08 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:101

area. A second noteworthy aspect was the comparison of the
institutional features in each system. To my knowledge, this is the
first time these have been aligned side-by-side for comparison in
this way, and the general reader will gain a very nuanced
understanding of all four jurisdictions after reading Part II of the
book. The third advantage was the discussion of the role of strong
presumptions of statutory consistency with rights, a topic
sometimes known as “reading down statutes,” or “as applied
challenges,” or “strong presumptions” of legislative compatibility
with rights. Gardbaum has explored with exceptional care and
accuracy the sovereignty implications of how judges use these
presumptions in the UK, New Zealand, and Australia in
particular, and reconciled that experience with the implications of
his theory. Even better, fourthly, is the way in which he
illuminates how the phenomenon of pre-enactment political
rights review has operated. While I think the most illuminating
work on this subject are deeper empirical studies, such as those
16
carried out by Janet Hiebert and Hunt, Hooper and Yowell,
Gardbaum’s comparative and theoretical analysis alerts us to
important nuances. A final advantage of this book is how it
artfully pairs theoretical insight with refined understanding of
institutional nuance, inviting favourable comparisons with writers
such as John Hart Ely, Cass Sunstein and Alexander Bickel.
II. CRITIQUE
I would make four key criticisms of Gardbaum’s book, the
first two relating to how the ideas were put across, and the second
two with the content of the book’s key normative proposals.
A. EQUIVOCATION ABOUT DESCRIPTION
Gardbaum is unclear about whether the New
Commonwealth Model is simply an account of the key features of
the four jurisdictions, namely (1) bill of rights, (2) pre-enactment
political rights review, (3) judicial review, and (4) legislative
supremacy, or whether the model only includes such systems that
16. See, e.g., Janet L. Hiebert, Governing under the Human Rights Act: The
Limitations of Wishful Thinking, 2012 PUB. L. 29; Janet L. Hiebert, Parliament and the
Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, 4 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 1 (2006); MURRAY HUNT, HAYLEY J. HOOPER & PAUL YOWELL, Parliaments and
Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit, AHRC PUBLIC POLICY SERIES NO. 5
(Arts & Human. Res. Council, Swindon, U.K.), 2012, available at
http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/News-and-Events/Publications/Documents/Parliaments-andHuman-Rights.pdf.
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also respect what he describes as the “internal theory of the New
Model”—namely unapologetic judicial review, legislative
reconsideration, and so on. The difference between the two
models is significant. Gardbaum’s book is on the one hand
seeking to draw attention to a system and defend it as original and
politically significant. But if we employ Gardbaum’s own theory
as set out in this book, all four jurisdictions fail to respect this ideal
in quite significant ways. So one does not know, when Gardbaum
says the experiment “is working,” whether he means “it would
work if the jurisdictions did what I recommend they do.”
This issue is best understood by considering an example. One
of many is the discussion of how the Canadian system
“institutionalizes the new model”:
[T]he [Canadian] Charter institutionalizes the new model
through the pre-enactment reporting duty and section 33. . . .
However, neither is operating satisfactorily or distinctly.
Section 33 . . . is suffering from a serious practical problem due
to its near non-use. . . . The same [problem] also occurs at the
pre-enactment stage, where executive . . . and legal . . . review
tend to predominate (pp. 127–28).

The reader is puzzled—on the assumption that
“institutionalize” means “give effect to,” this passage sends a
rather mixed message. Are they institutionalized or not? And is
what institutionalized? Formal legislative supremacy, or a
practice of reasonable disagreement? Which, in other words, is
the “model”? This equivocation is found in other parts of the
book as well. Notably, the “case” for the New Commonwealth
Model is set out in chapter 3, prior to the “internal theory” of the
model in chapter 4, where he expounds the various norms. Yet in
reality, the “case” for the Model defends the acceptability of the
systems in terms that must respect the norms he sets out in chapter
4—the two are in reality a continuous normative argument for a
system that departs in important ways from the jurisdictions he
examines. This book is better read as this normative argument.
Yet the author wants to have things both ways, by claiming
simultaneously to describe and justify a practice, implying that it
only needs tinkering at the margins to fully respect the ideal it
implicitly subscribes to. But the required tinkering is more
fundamental than marginal, and there is no evidence that the
jurisdictions actually subscribe to the principles he identifies.
Indeed, on my understanding, the evidence from Canada is that
Section 33 was never intended to be used regularly, and likewise
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with Section 4 of the UK Human Rights Act, as the White Paper
17
made amply clear.
Sometimes Gardbaum claims that the “essential features” of
the model are derived from the legal systems he describes (pp. 1–
2, see also pp. 8ff, especially pp. 10–16), and he is, throughout Part
II in particular, concerned with the question of fit. Yet at others,
he candidly admits that the various systems often fail to live up to
how the theory he announces is “supposed to work.” After
clarifying that neither Canada, nor Australia, nor the UK
effectively respect the crucial criteria of legislative
reconsideration, he claims that New Zealand, “although certainly
not ideal, especially in terms of the quality of legislative rights
deliberation . . . still seems to be a fairly good example of how the
new model is supposed to work” (p. 229). But the gap prompts a
hard question: why call it the “New Commonwealth Model” if it
does not in fact describe those jurisdictions? The problem is not
just with legislative reconsideration, either. The pre-enactment
rights review varies considerably in quality and character, and in
none of these four jurisdictions is there anything like
“unapologetic” judicial review. Democratic legitimacy is an
omnipresent consideration conditioning the judicial role in the
jurisprudence of these four jurisdictions.
In a section in chapter 9 Gardbaum asks whether the new
model “is operating” in a distinct, intermediate manner, and lists,
with admirable rigour and fairness, the many obstacles to the view
that it is. One wishes he had concluded the section with “no, it
isn’t,” and moved on. But that conclusion may have necessitated
some invasive surgery elsewhere in the book. Indeed, the next
section is entitled “Normative promise fulfilled?” and the answer
would have been brief if the conclusion was that the model was
not observed. But in this same section he claims that to some
extent it has been, before concluding that “the NZBORA is
operating in the most distinctly new model way, [but is] still far
from the ideal described in Chapter 4” (p. 233). The Section 33
power of legislative override in Canada’s system, the essential
“new model feature,” you may recall, is acknowledged as having
17. On Canada, this is the clear conclusion of Johansen and Rosen, supra note 11,
though that was the dominant rather than exclusive view; and for the United Kingdom,
this is the explicit statement in the White Paper introducing the Human Rights Bill to
Parliament: ‘2.10 A declaration that legislation is incompatible with the Convention rights
will not of itself have the effect of changing the law, which will continue to apply. But it
will almost certainly prompt the Government and Parliament to change the law.’ RIGHTS
BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL 1997 (CM 3782, 1997).
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the “practical problem” of not being used (p.127). These sound
like evasive ways of saying “no,” but they also further complicate
the message about what precisely the New Model is—what is
actually occurring, or Gardbaum’s theory of what should occur.
B. METHODOLOGY OF THE THIRD WAY AND THE BLENDING
OF POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
But perhaps we should interpret the book as a program for
reforming these jurisdictions, instead of describing them? This
leads me to some problems with the methodology. The
methodology that anchors the normative program is plain and
repeated often: Gardbaum is “blending,” “mixing,” in the attempt
to “combine and accommodate” two competing views, to create a
“hybrid” theory that represents a “third way” or a “new third
option” between the two poles, “the constitutionalist equivalent
of the mixed economy” (pp. 34, 64, 67, 232). There is nothing
inherently wrong with such an approach, of course. Yet the
slogans alone evoke the fear that it might too easily seek a
compromise between incompatible positions. And the fear is well
placed.
The jurisdictional blending is an issue I have addressed
above. But the principal objects of the blending in this book are
the pros and cons of two schools of thought in British legal
academia known as political and legal constitutionalism. “Political
constitutionalism” earned its label from the important Chorley
Lecture given by Professor John Griffith at the London School of
Economics in 1978, and published the following year in the
18
Modern Law Review. Griffith’s was a claim that the UK
constitution is largely shaped by political actors, and that judges
play a minor role in articulating or enforcing its rules. He also
criticized liberal forms of constitutionalism that sought to elevate
principles and rights above the fray of politics. He was a political
pluralist, most admirably described by Graham Gee as having an
19
“agonistic” conception of politics, one who thought that in the
field of constitutional politics there was nothing but disagreement,
and that liberal human rights principles such as those found in the
ECHR were “the statement of a political conflict pretending to be

18. J.A.G. Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1979); see also
Graham Gee and Grégoire C. N. Webber, What is a Political Constitution?, 30 OXFORD
J.L. STUD. 273 (2010).
19. Graham Gee, The Political Constitutionalism of J.A.G. Griffith, 28 L. STUD. 20
(2007).

KING GARDBAUM REVIEW_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

114

12/29/2014 3:08 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:101

a resolution of it.” 20 Griffith, unlike some subsequent political
constitutionalists, but compatible with the Marxist critique of
bourgeois rights, was a rights-sceptic about both rights-rhetoric as
well as judicial enforcement. His theory was pregnant with a
critique of courts, and in his classic book The Politics of the
21
Judiciary, he sets out that normative case in polemical terms. But
he claimed his project was more descriptive than normative.
The theory received its more explicit normative cast by
subsequent writers, notably Adam Tomkins, and especially
Richard Bellamy, whose book Political Constitutionalism is the
22
most theoretically sophisticated version. In this cast, the
advocates of the theory generally adopt Jeremy Waldron’s
argument (which is more similar to Griffith’s than has been
generally noticed) that in a society like Britain or the U.S., where
there is general respect for people’s basic rights, but reasonable
disagreement over their meaning, considerations of political
equality support assigning interpretive authority to legislatures
23
rather than courts. Furthermore, the argument runs, there are no
strong instrumentalist or outcome-related arguments in favor of
24
judicial interpretation. To the contrary, the record suggests that,
in America at least, judicial review has been at least as negative
as positive, and, furthermore, the form of reasoning adopted by
courts is unduly legalistic and pedantic, rather than institutionally
and normatively wide-ranging as moral argument should be.
The other school of thought is “legal constitutionalism,” one
whose basic feature is confidence in the capacity of judicially
enforced principles and rights to help sustain a rights-based
democracy. Legal constitutionalism is a label and refined category
invented by (later) political constitutionalists to describe their
25
intellectual enemies, and a few legal scholars have accepted the
26
challenge and adopted the label. It is in my view perhaps
20.
21.
22.

Griffith, supra note 18, at 14.
J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (1977).
ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2005); RICHARD
BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007).
23. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
24. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1376–86 (2006). In LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 23, at 252–54 Waldron
rejected the conceptual plausibility of instrumentalist arguments in favor of judicial review.
25. A clear exposition of it and its chief tenets is found in TOMKINS, supra note 22,
at 11. Extremely few jurists, in my view, subscribe strongly to the six tenets he outlines.
26. Paul P. Craig, Political Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, in EFFECTIVE
JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CORNERSTONE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 19 (Christopher Forsyth,
Mark Elliott, Swati Jhaveri, Anne Scully-Hill, Michael Ramsden, eds., 2010); Tom R.
Hickman, In Defence of the Legal Constitution, 55 U. TORONTO. L.J. 981 (2005).
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unfortunate, but at any rate those who accept the label
nonetheless refashion the definition such that it is a more accurate
portrayal of the more common view and bears little resemblance
27
to the one created by the political constitutionalists as a foil. The
people charged as legal constitutionalists by writers such as
Tomkins, Poole and others, are not mere apologists for judicial
review, oblivious to the political side of the constitution, and
critics of the regulatory state. To the contrary, their writings in my
view often betray less preoccupation with courts than do those of
28
many of the modern political constitutionalists. British public
lawyers, such as Jeffrey Jowell, Paul Craig, Dawn Oliver, Aileen
Kavanagh, and the all-time favorite, Ronald Dworkin, have been
29
identified as legal constitutionalists. True, they do support what
in Britain can be regarded as a strong judicial role in the
protection of human rights (though something that would be
unrecognizably timid in the United States, Germany or India).
Yet they are hardly opponents of the basic welfare and regulatory
30
state in the way the charge of “liberal-legalism” makes out, nor
are their writings insensitive to the role of Parliament and
administration. Beyond their support for judicial review in some
form, there is no commonality beyond this, neither in the view
that judges have the common law power to disregard statutes, nor
that we should have an entrenched bill of rights rather than the
repealable Human Rights Act 1998, nor that judges should not
31
give democratic legitimacy great weight in adjudication. Above
all there is certainly nothing to suggest in this British debate that
there is any ignorance of the overwhelmingly important role
27. See Craig, supra note 26; Hickman, supra note 26.
28. Nearly half of Paul Craig’s ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 7th
ed. 2012) is about administration rather than judicial control, whereas Jeffrey Jowell’s LAW
AND BUREAUCRACY: ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL
ACTION (1976) concerned both judicial restraint and was an empirical study of
adjudication involving participant observation in welfare decision-making. Dawn Oliver
has edited several books on the UK Parliament and the law, as well as on the regulatory
state, and she sat on the Royal Commission for the Reform of the House of Lords
(Wakeham Commission), which reported to Parliament in 2000.
29. TOMKINS, supra note 22, at 11.
30. Adam Tomkins, In Defence of the Political Constitution, 22 OXFORD J. L. STUD.
157 (2002).
31. CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH (ED.), JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSTITUTION
(2000) (demonstrating that writers such as Paul Craig and T.R.S. Allan agree that the
authority for judicial review of executive action is derived from the common law rather
than statute, but disagree strongly about whether the common law must respect the
sovereignty of Parliament); Dawn Oliver, Parliament and the Courts: a Pragmatic (or
Principled) Defence of the Sovereignty of Parliament, in PARLIAMENT AND THE LAW
(Alexander Horne, Gavin Drewry, & Dawn Oliver eds., 2013); Aileen Kavanagh, Judicial
Restraint in the Pursuit of Justice, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 23 (2010).
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played in the constitution by a (sovereign) Westminster
32
I might add, too, that although political
Parliament.
constitutionalism is a more coherent doctrinal position (having
been defined by people who believe in it), there is also interesting
33
work exploring its own nuances and internal differences.
One can thus see that a normative argument based upon
blending these two schools of thought will be on a perilous
journey. We can turn now to Gardbaum’s general definition of the
two positions:
Roughly speaking, political constitutionalism stands for the
proposition that the limits on governmental power inherent in
the concept of constitutionalism – limits that qualify the noun
in the term “constitutional democracy” – and especially those
that are expressed in terms of individual rights and liberties,
are or should be predominantly political in nature, enforced
through the ordinary mechanisms of Madisonian-style
structural constraints and especially, through electoral
accountability. [. . .] By contrast, legal constitutionalists believe
that these limits in general, and rights in particular, are or
should be predominantly legal in nature and enforced through
the power of courts to disapply acts that exceed them (p. 22).

This definition prompts the following objection: can one not
believe that political protections do and ought to predominate in
constitutional practice, while at the same time support
constitutional judicial review in either restricted UK form or even
strong form, as in Germany and America? The answer is surely
34
yes. Even Dworkin took that view, and the definition here ill
suits several hardly-marginal writers who support a quite
attenuated, politically sensitive role for constitutional
35
as well as for those avowed political
adjudication,
32. The one (outstanding) exception to this claim is the work of Professor T.R.S.
Allan at Cambridge. Professor Allan’s work is profound and important, but not
representative of even a majority of those who favor constitutional judicial review. See
T.R.S. ALLAN, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW (2013).
33. See Gee & Webber, supra note 18; Marco Goldoni, Two Internal Critiques of
Political Constitutionalism, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 926 (2012).
34. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 27 (1985) (“If all political power
were transferred to judges, democracy and equality of political power would be destroyed.
But we are now considering only a small and special class of political decisions.”).
35. There are many: JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1981); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (2001); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN
PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004) ; CONOR
GEARTY, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION (2005); Rosalind Dixon, A
New Theory of Charter Dialogue: The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue and
Deference, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 235 (2009); AILEEN KAVANAGH,
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constitutionalists who see human rights adjudication in weak form
systems not having strong legislative reconsideration as
36
potentially compatible with their position. In my view, the better
approach here is to avoid the generalizations and keep
disagreements focused on meaningful areas of dispute.
Gardbaum can parry here by justly claiming that whatever
the issue with labels, he has focused the discussion by outlining
the distinct pros and cons he associates with each school of
thought. Political constitutionalism has two strengths, which for
ease of reference for the remainder of this essay I will set off as
37
such (pp. 51–61) :
(PC1) parliamentary sovereignty permits a system that is
“ultimately within the scope of the democratic principles
of equal participation”; and
(PC2) legislators are better moral reasoners because they
are not distracted by text, precedent etc.
But it also has weaknesses:
(PC3) legislatures are prone to pathologies and blind
spots, such as the problem of political inertia, attending
to minorities, and so on; and
(PC4) rights are better protected by courts because
“legislative deliberation and political accountability are
insufficient to ensure that burdened individuals are
provided with the reasonable justification to which they
are entitled.”
Each claim is problematic, however. In my view, the PC1
claim is not only dependent on a Waldronian view that, as often
pointed out, neither accounts adequately for the problem of
majoritarian legislative bias, nor explains why representative
democracy is more egalitarian than populist measures such as
ballot initiatives and referenda. 38 It is also in tension with
Gardbaum’s own views of legislative defects. The claim at PC2 is
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (2009); Alison Young,
Is Dialogue Working under the Human Rights Act 1998?, 2011 PUB. L. 773 [hereinafter Is
Dialogue Working]; Alison Young, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT (2008).
36. See, e.g., Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act,
9 I.CON 86 (2011).
37. This is the core of his discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of both political
and legal constitutionalism.
38. I address these arguments more fully in ch.6 of JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL
RIGHTS (2012), but similar criticisms can be found in the work of Ronald Dworkin,
Dymitrios Kyritsis, and Aileen Kavanagh.
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suspect too. The claim that parliamentarians are less fettered by
text, etc., is at stark odds with the attitudinal model which finds it
is almost impossible to find doctrinal constraints in the
jurisprudence of some top courts, notably the U.S. Supreme
39
Court. The proportionality test, looking to Canada and Europe,
40
is hardly a restrictive normative exercise. On the other hand,
PC3, a claim I tend to agree with, is ordinarily met with the
following reply—legislative pathologies may exist, but they are
unavoidable, less problematic and less illegitimate problems than
41
those generated by judicial meddling. And PC4 is a curious
statement, with apologies to Matthias Kumm. Of course the
enacted law was accompanied by a public justification, it was the
protracted procedure known as the legislative process. The idea
that every citizen is owed an individualized justification on the
record in the courthouse seems to me neither persuasive nor
sustainable. The bald acceptance at PC4, moreover, that
legislative sovereignty under-enforces rights will (or ought to) be
untenable to political constitutionalists, who have tended to deny
42
it in strong terms, and the claim is not backed up here by any
evidence.
The fatal problem in my view is that PC1 and PC3 are
mutually incompatible. It cannot be said that legislative
supremacy “respects democratic principles of equal
participation” while also conceding that it is ridden with
pathologies that disadvantage some people systematically. Where
the systematic disadvantage starts, the egalitarianism stops. So
much is conceded by both Waldron and Bellamy, and their
argument upon such concession switches to a different one – that
43
courts are no adequate remedy for the legislative flaw.
Legal constitutionalism, in this dialectic of arguments, is also
problematic. Its two advantages are said to be as follows:
(LC1) it fosters public recognition and consciousness of
rights, through the announcement in a bill of rights;
39. JEFFREY A. SEAGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
40. GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE
LIMITATION OF RIGHTS (2009).
41. See generally BELLAMY, supra note 22, at ch. 3.
42. The usual cite here is to GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2008). See, e.g., BELLAMY, supra note 22, at
95–97, and the vast literature I explore more generally in KING, supra note 38, at chapter
3. Indeed, the leitmotif of the functionalist school of public law is that judicial review has
been corrosive of good administration.
43. BELLAMY, supra note 22, at 26–48; Waldron, supra note 24, at 1404.
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(LC2) it can correct for legislative pathologies and
blindspots, and correct the legislative under-enforcement
of rights, by prompting legislators to use their
deliberative capacity to evaluate concrete cases at the
behest of adjudicators who are not electorally
accountable at the ballot box (and are hence “politically
independent” in this particular way).
Yet the disadvantages are noteworthy as well:
(LC3) courts will over-enforce constitutional limits,
Lochner-style, by impeding progressive legislative
change with conservative judicial rulings;
(LC4) courts can become the primary expositors of rights
in society, allowing legislators’ rights sensibilities to
wither.
The political constitutionalist will doubt the political
invigoration resulting from a bill of rights, but also point out that
we could adopt a non-justiciable bills of rights. And the judicial
ability to correct for legislative pathologies (LC2), as the political
constitutionalist will argue, must be better than what legislatures
can achieve, net of the costs of judicial over-enforcement (PC4).
That courts will over-enforce constitutional rights is the flip side
of the claim (PC4) that legislatures under-enforce them. The legal
constitutionalist, for her part, can say there is really very little
evidence of over-enforcement in Britain and Canada, where the
system works similar to a stronger style of judicial review.
Lochner happened in the U.S., a century ago.44 Unfortunately, we
simply cannot square these competing claims in the realm of
theory. They do not compute. We need recourse to some rigorous
empirical studies. This is a problem in chapter 3, because it is
entirely concerned with responding to assertions in constitutional
theory literature when the questions of impact seem critical to the
overall argument.
Of course, Gardbaum cannot be faulted for not addressing
every counter-argument. It would disrupt the great flow of the
44. The Canadian decision of Chaoulli v Quebec (AG) [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 is a
potential counter-example. See Sujit Choudry, Worse than Lochner?, in ACCESS TO CARE,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN
CANADA (Colleen Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., 2005); cf. Jeff King,
Constitutional Rights and Social Welfare: A Comment on the Canadian Chaoulli Health
Care Decision 69 MOD. L. REV. 631 (2006). In the result, Chaoulli was largely ignored:
Daniel Cohn, Chaoulli Five Years On: All Bark and No Bite?, (Working Paper presented
to The Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2010), available at
www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Cohn.pdf.
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book if he did, and indeed it may have distracted him from
expounding the features of the New Model systems. But on the
other hand, when these arguments are meant to anchor the quite
radical proposals of “no judicial deference” and “vigorous
legislative reconsideration,” neither of which is actually found in
the practice of these four jurisdictions, one is left wanting more.
My sense is that the foundations of this theory are based on
positions that are clearly rejected by adherents of both schools he
tries to combine, and they are not reconcilable either. Someone
must be wrong. Perhaps in future work Gardbaum will explore in
greater detail why some of those positions were wrong, or why it
is, in fact, and contrary to all expectations, possible to reconcile
them.
C. THE VIABILITY OF THE ARGUMENT FOR STRONG
LEGISLATIVE RECONSIDERATION
My primary misgiving with the book is with its proposal that
legislatures should disregard judicial declarations of rights in a de
rigueur fashion. Gardbaum asserts that this criteria “permits the
new model to neutralize legal constitutionalism’s democratic
legitimacy problem” (p. 68). When outlining this feature in
greater detail in chapter 4, he recalls that the case against judicial
finality is that judicial reasoning is too legalistic (PC2), and also
suggests, in different wording, that the ongoing and regularly
asserted legislative supremacy “can also satisfy more general
criteria of political legitimacy” (p. 89), by which he presumably
means political equality. But he introduces another novel
argument, namely, that the pathologies “can be countered by less
restrictive procedural and/or substantive constraints on outcomes
than a full judicial veto” (p. 89).
The large and unanswered question is, why should we expect
the legislative pathologies Gardbaum highlights to be cured when
the issue returns to Parliament and it is invited to disagree with
the court? Gardbaum evidently believes that the two norms he
commends for the exercise of this power of legislative
reconsideration – good faith legislative engagement with the
court’s reasoning, and disagreement only if the legislature
reasonably disagrees – are going to be potent restraints on
legislative behavior. It is an open question whether the first even
could be a restraint. I am not certain that one can realistically
expect parliamentarians to routinely debate the merits of legal
reasoning. The Hansard I have reviewed, and all other studies on
the UK Parliament’s consideration of judicial decisions under the
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Human Rights Act 1998, suggests that parliamentarians are
singularly uninterested in the reasoning of the courts, even when
45
they agree with the judgments. (That is not to say that
parliamentary reasoning on the rights issues themselves is poor –
I speak only of engagement with the judgment). Part of the reason
is that Members of Parliament tend to think judgments are
specialist law, and are outside their comfort zone. Another, quite
serious reason is that some Members or Peers regard it as an
affront to judicial independence to challenge the reasoning of
judges. Another, more logistical reason, is that some judgments
are often long, more often boring, and it isn’t clear that busy
parliamentarians with many irons in the fire are going to want to
pore over the particulars of the judgments they are anyway
welcome to ignore. Contrary to what lawyers may like to think,
the experience in the UK has been that most declarations of
incompatibility, which all but automatically come up for
parliamentary consideration, have had a very “low profile” in
46
Parliament. This is because the issues have tended, in the UK at
any rate, to be comparatively minor next to the major battles
fought in other legislation, or even in the same legislation into
which the remedial provision is inserted.
Let’s assume, however optimistically, that Gardbaum is right
that many of these problems could be overcome, and we could get
Parliament to engage with the reasoning of the courts. This may
well be an attractive idea, and a strength of this book is certainly
its grasp of the institutional dynamics. The greater problem is with
the idea that a standard of “reasonable disagreement” will do any
work in disciplining the legislature’s rejection of judicial decisions.
The standard might have done some work if the parliament was
entitled only to nullify the judgment if it thought the judgment
was unreasonable. One could plausibly see the UK Parliament, for
instance, only resolving on rare occasions that a judgment of the
UK Supreme Court was unreasonable, even if it would be minded
to disagree with it more often. But that is not what Gardbaum
commends. His test is whether the legislature has its own
reasonable judgment that is nonetheless at odds with the court's
(perhaps reasonable) judgment. So the question is, when is the
legislature going to conclude a debate in which it resolves that it
45. King, supra note 15; see also Young, Is Dialogue Working, supra note 35, at 783–
84; ARUNA SATHANAPALLY, BEYOND DISAGREEMENT: OPEN REMEDIES IN HUMAN
RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 138–39 (2012);
46. Sathanapally, supra note 45, at 138–39; King, supra note 15, at the text
accompanying note 87 (giving examples).
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disagrees with the reasoning of the court, but believes that its own
opinion is unreasonable? Of course, never. If not, then how is the
practice of judicial review meant to overcome the legislative
pathologies and blind spots? It may help with the logistical ones
(the burdens of inertia), by drawing Parliament’s attention to the
issue and prompting a response. But what of the really pressing
concern that Gardbaum acknowledges as part of the case for
judicial review in the first place (PC3/LC2), namely, the
“sensitivity to the rights . . . of various electoral minorities whether criminal defendants, asylum-seekers, or minority racial,
ethnic or religious groups . . . .” (p. 54)? I am doubtful that the
rule of legislative reconsideration, including the two normative
guidelines outlined by Gardbaum, would extend real protection
to these groups. Indeed, his candid admission that PC3 is a real
problem appears to me inconsistent with the proposed solution.
And the different track records evident in New Zealand and the
United Kingdom appear to be to be partially, if not primarily, a
47
result of the perceived obligation to respond. If the reply here is
that it is expected that legislatures will just agree with the court’s
decision most of the time, I feel that is counter-intuitive and the
evidence for it is slim.
One is tempted to say that this is a minor flaw. But if we
remove Gardbaum’s specific rule of legislative reconsideration,
we also need to let go of his proposal for “unapologetic” judicial
review. And since the pre-enactment rights review he discusses is
probably compatible with strong form systems of judicial review,
what remains is a system that differs considerably from
Gardbaum’s New Commonwealth Model. It is important to
recognize as well that there are many reasons one might support
a system of weak form review without a regular practice of
legislative reconsideration. Under such a system, the legislature
enjoys ongoing legal authority to disagree with the courts and in
some systems to repeal the bill of rights—both of which are quite
meaningful powers. Yet Gardbaum wants much more
disagreement. He regards his model as being close to what
prevails in New Zealand, where the two local commentators
observe that “the impact of the NZBORA on Parliament’s
behavior is so minimal in nature as to be almost irrelevant” and

47. I discuss this obligation and adduce statements in the UK Parliament above in
King, supra note 15.
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that the Act results in “very limited insurance for rights
48
protection” (p. 145).
D. THE RULE OF LAW AND COURTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL
ADVISERS
My final misgiving is about the rule of law and the authority
of law in the brave new world of the ideal theory Gardbaum sets
out. He envisages a constitutional system in which judicial
declarations of rights are politely acknowledged and duly set
aside. The idea that a court could merely provide an opinion that
can be accepted or ignored—like the advice of a law officer—
misconceives the nature of legal authority in the modern state.
More importantly, it sends a mixed message to citizens about the
scope of their rights under constitutional law. This view can be
called the “courts as legal advisers” view.
In his excellent book, Public Law and the Human Rights Act,
Tom Hickman considers a variety of such views, which he dubs
49
the “principle–proposing” model of dialogue. Some of these
views, those of Klug and Nicol, have already been addressed
above. Hickman rejects these views because they are
incompatible with the proper constitutional role of the judiciary.
Courts should hear arguments, not advance them to the legislative
branches. I agree with Hickman’s conclusions about the
proposal’s poor fit with current constitutional orthodoxy, but
want to push on to argue why this constitutional orthodoxy should
not be reconfigured in the way Gardbaum envisages.
To be clear, his view is not the same as, for instance, asking a
court to declare the existence of constitutional convention
50
without enforcing it. The politicians can abide the convention or
not, but they cannot in my view turn around and say the court was
wrong about its existence. Its existence was settled by the
judgment. Nor is Gardbaum’s proposed role for courts similar to
the practice in some advisory opinions of declaring legal
51
principles (or rules) to exist without enforcing them. In such
cases, the courts do not suggest such principles are “negotiable.”
48. Citing Geddis, supra note 13, at 471; James B. Kelly, Judicial and Political Review
as Limited Insurance: The Functioning of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act in ‘Hard’
cases, 49 COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 295, 296 (2011).
49. TOM HICKMAN, PUBLIC LAW AFTER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 83–87 (2010).
50. Reference re a Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753
(Supreme Court of Canada).
51. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Supreme Court of
Canada).
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By contrast, under the New Commonwealth Model, a person
could fight her case up to the Supreme Court to obtain something
declaratory of nothing more than an opinion. What does she get
from court here? A view? Have her rights been violated or not,
after the Supreme Court says so? These are not minor matters,
and a patient citizen’s tour through dialogue theory or the
Waldronian line on reasonable disagreement will generate
confusion (I have tried). Strategically, furthermore, people would
have to look well past the courts when contemplating litigation.
Impact litigation to help improve minority rights would have to
reckon with the possibility that the legislature might even use the
occasion raised by an adverse ruling to roll back protection even
further. This could disincentivize resort to litigation, which would
undo the supposed “hybrid” benefits of the model.
What I see as most problematic is the constitutional position
of the courts. Without a norm requiring the legislature to not
depart from judicial findings lightly, the courts will know that to
issue judgments that will be ignored will undermine their
52
credibility and thus institutional integrity. It will ultimately result
in an exercise of brinksmanship in which one of the two sides will
back down—presumably the courts. That would undermine the
very benefits of judicial review in the first place, and make
“unapologetic” judicial review rather unlikely.
This gives occasion to comment on a debate at present in the
United Kingdom, which is about whether Parliament should feel
it appropriate to disregard declarations of incompatibility under
the Human Rights Act 1998. The working presumption now is
53
that it should not. It ought to respond. But respond how? Should
it always amend or repeal the law, or could it, for instance,
respond by reaffirming the law by way of resolution? Either
interpretation is plausible. My own view is that if Parliament
regularly refused to repeal the impugned laws they would disrupt
the constitutional arrangements put into place under the Human
Rights Act 1998. It is true that Parliament has the clear legal
authority to disregard a declaration. And it is clearly foreseen that
it would be possible for it to do so in particular circumstances. No
one has as yet outlined what such circumstances should be,
because until the prisoner voting saga few thought that

52. Some feared that this would occur in the UK, since the UK Parliament can not
only ignore judicial decisions but must act affirmatively to remedy the incompatibility. It
is not clear that it happened, has but the point is arguable.
53. King, supra note 15.
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Parliament would disregard a declaration of incompatibility. 54 I
would argue that such circumstances would need to be highly
unusual: it should be on an issue where Parliament has engaged
directly and at some length with the key issue, and where the law’s
amendment or repeal would have an adverse effect upon a very
substantial number of people in the society, and where the
exercise is perceived to be exceptional rather than the dawn of a
new practice of disagreement. If the legislature wishes to feel
unbound, it should rather repeal the Human Rights Act 1998. To
treat declarations as negotiable is to belie the objective of the Act
when it was introduced, which was to provide a remedy in
domestic courts for violations of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The better approach, and one observed by the
governments and parliaments in the UK thus far, is to consider
that so long as the Act remains in place, the presumption is that
Parliament will amend the laws found incompatible. Should the
courts’ role under this arrangement be viewed as undesirable, the
Human Rights Act 1998 should be repealed.
To be clear, the argument is not merely an interpretation of
the purpose of the Act. There are compelling reasons of
constitutional principle as well. To permit a declaration of
incompatibility without any regular presumption of
parliamentary action removing the incompatibility would be a
cruel waste of time and money for litigants and defeat the good
purpose of the Act, which was to provide claimants with real
rather than illusory remedies in English courts for violations of
their Convention rights. Although this analysis is limited to the
situation in the UK, I believe that similar reasoning applies in
respect of Section 33 in Canada. As noted above, in both
jurisdictions, the intention upon introduction of these novel
features was that they would be used, if at all, only in extremely
rare circumstances.
In my view, Gardbaum’s proposal stems from an attempt to
have things both ways by hybridizing two views, neither of which
had the authority problem to which I am drawing attention here.
Supporters of judicial review may disagree strongly with each
other about how much restraint judges should show to legislators.
But they all agree that judicial decisions should be respected and
observed. And Waldron, Bellamy, and Tomkins all make
54. This is a moving target but most of the background can be found in Ian White,
Prisoners’ Voting Rights (SN/PC/01764) (London, Parliament and Constitution Centre,
House of Commons Library, 15 May 2013) and R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice;
McGeoch v Lord President of the Council [2013] UKSC 63.
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arguments about assigning clear interpretive authority to
legislatures rather than courts. Gardbaum’s theory would create
a “dispersal of responsibility” (p. 68) for decision-making about
rights between these authorities, but in so doing, he forgets that if
these rights are to be law, we are entitled to expect authoritative
legal ruling on their scope. I would regret to see judicial decisions
become mere advice. I would prefer a form of judicial rights
review that gives weight to the various valid concerns raised in this
excellent book, urging judges to defer in appropriate cases to
parliament, and, where judges perform within the role set out for
them in the bill of rights, for parliament to return the favor.

